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Benjamin Claessens

bclaessens@gradcenter.cuny.edu | CV

I'm a PhD candidate in philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center.

My research is about purpose, and our representations of purpose. I argue that teleological belief is central to our experience of agency. If we could better understand the content and cognitive underpinnings of teleological belief, then so too could we better understand agency and its adjacent phenomena—intention, desire, practical reason, identification, evaluation, and motivation. My dissertation on these topics is supervised by Eric Mandelbaum (chair), Sarah Paul, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, and Daniel Harris.

I received my bachelor's degree in philosophy and linguistics from the University of Western Australia. Before that, I studied film and played music in a punk band. 


Publications

(2024) Wonderful Worlds: Disinterested Engagement and Environmental Aesthetic Appreciation. British Journal of Aesthetics, 64(1). 89-106. 

Read | Listen

Abstract. Among the infinitude of nature’s various forms, precisely what should we aesthetically appreciate? And supposing we come to achieve such discernment, how should we properly appreciate the aesthetic qualities we thereby find? To address these questions, Carlson has argued that the aesthetic appreciation of nature ought to be guided by scientific insight. In response, non-cognitivists have levelled criticism and suggested alternatives, yet Carlson’s (2009) scientific cognitivism remains the best-argued approach to nature appreciation in the field. One non-cognitivist position that Carlson rejects—although much too quickly—is Berleant’s (1985) engagement model. The purpose of this paper is to modify and revive that model. Specifically, I will argue that genuine engagement requires a particular form of disinterest. The result is a non-cognitivist approach to the aesthetic appreciation of nature, stronger than the extant alternatives.

In Progress

A paper arguing that we acquire teleological beliefs by statistical inference (under review). 

A paper arguing that intentions are teleological beliefs about one's own behavior (under review).

A paper arguing that teleological beliefs motivate goal-directed behavior.

Teaching

Introduction to Philosophy | Syllabus

Moral Issues in Business | Syllabus

Philosophical Issues in Literature | Syllabus

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