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Abstract. How do we acquire teleological beliefs? A teleological belief is a belief that some event or process occurs for the sake of a purpose. Such beliefs include beliefs about actions, natural functions, and the meaning of life. This paper will advance a theory of teleological inference. I will argue 1) that we acquire teleological beliefs by statistical inference, 2) that we conceive of a purpose as a type of difference-maker, and 3) that we infer purposive relations as apparent difference-making relations. The proposed theory claims empirical, phenomenological, and theoretical support. Empirically, it best explains the teleological bias: the universal human disposition to endorse teleological explanations of phenomena. It also explains a range of observed interactions between causal, normative, and purposive judgment. The theory suggests that mental state attributions play no essential role in teleological inference, and explains the phenomenal character of agentive experience.

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Abstract. Among the infinitude of nature’s various forms, precisely what should we aesthetically appreciate? And supposing we come to achieve such discernment, how should we properly appreciate the aesthetic qualities we thereby find? To address these questions, Carlson has argued that the aesthetic appreciation of nature ought to be guided by scientific insight. In response, non-cognitivists have levelled criticism and suggested alternatives, yet Carlson’s (2009) scientific cognitivism remains the best-argued approach to nature appreciation in the field. One non-cognitivist position that Carlson rejects—although much too quickly—is Berleant’s (1985) engagement model. The purpose of this paper is to modify and revive that model. Specifically, I will argue that genuine engagement requires a particular form of disinterest. The result is a non-cognitivist approach to the aesthetic appreciation of nature, stronger than the extant alternatives.

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Abstract. Folk-attributions of intention and desire appear central to the prediction and explanation of goal-directed behavior. But what are intentions and desires, and how do we acquire predictively reliable beliefs about them? Although there are many suggestions, extant literature does not adequately explain how we initially come to represent behavior as goal-directed; it does not address the question of teleological belief acquisition. This dissertation examines the content and cognition of teleological belief, and then analyzes intention and desire in terms of such belief; an intention is a type of desire, and a desire is a teleological belief about one’s own behavior. Such beliefs, I argue, entail predictions. The overall upshot is a parsimonious ontology of the mind; folk-attributions of intention and desire each track teleological beliefs, and practical reason reduces to theoretical reason.